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CHINESE RESOURCE-FOR-INFRASTRUCTURE 
(RFI) INVESTMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE “RULES-BASED” 
FRAMEWORK FOR SOVEREIGN FINANCE: 
THE SICOMINES CASE STUDY
Jingwei Xu*
I. Introduction
Chinese investment in sub-Saharan Africa has exploded over the past 
few decades and involves a deep collaboration between ostensibly private 
Chinese commercial parties and the Chinese state’s sovereign interests. 
While the diversity of the Chinese political economy
1
has generated a multi-
tude of modes and structures for Chinese investment abroad,
2
foreign policy 
and security interests have prompted the Chinese state to loom especially 
large in global natural resource and infrastructure development
3
—sectors 
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School (2020). This note grew out of Professor 
Laura Nyantung Beny’s 2018 “Africa and the Global Legal System” seminar, and its devel-
opment is indebted to Professor Beny’s mentorship and guidance. I also thank Professors 
Mark Wu and Steven Ratner, the participants of the 2019 Salzburg Cutler Fellows program, 
Luke Sperduto, and Nicholas Orr for their helpful insights and comments on earlier drafts. 
Finally, I am grateful for the stellar editing and support of the editorial staff at MJIL—of 
whom I would especially like to thank Chris Opila and Lindsay Bernsen Wardlaw for their 
input.
1. The Chinese political economy is best described as a system in which the “party-
state remains all-powerful, but private enterprise drives significant economic activity.” Mark 
Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261, 270 
(2016). Existing economic paradigms like “state capitalism,” “socialism,” or “free market 
economy” do not adequately capture the Chinese system’s unique characteristics. Id; see also
John Osburg, Global Capitalisms in Asia: Beyond State in Market in China, 72 J. ASIAN 
STUD. 813, 814–15 (2013); Wentong Zheng & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Ownership: State 
Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015).
2. See, e.g., Giles Mohan & May Tan-Mullins, The Geopolitics of South-South Infra-
structure Development: Chinese-Financed Energy Projects in the Global South, 56 URBAN 
STUD. 1368, 1372 (2019) (“While the types of contracts adopted by Chinese firms vary, the 
most relevant [to the study] are ‘EPC’ (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) contracts 
that circumscribe the obligations of the contractors and contrast with longer-term commit-
ments through the ‘BOT’ (Build, Operate and Transfer) contracts increasingly used in Public–
Private Partnerships”). See generally DEBORAH BRÄUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE 
REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2009).
3. See Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble for Africa’s Oil and Mineral 
Resources: Blessing or Curse?, 42 INT’L LAW. 193, 198 (2008) (“Indeed, China [has] de-
clared energy security as one of the most important goals of its foreign policy.”); see also Jo-
seph McCarthy, Crude ‘Oil Mercantilism’? Chinese Oil Engagement in Kazakhstan, 86 
PACIFIC AFF. 257, 265 (2013) (noting that the Chinese Communist Party leadership regards 
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that hold especially vast growth potential in many African states.
4
In this 
sector, China, contracting through its state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), has 
been particularly involved in resource-for-infrastructure (“RFI”) investment. 
RFI transactional structures, broadly speaking, integrate bilateral develop-
ment lending, direct aid, infrastructure-building, and resource extraction to 
such an extent that it is “virtually impossible to unbundle” what elements 
constitute Chinese “aid,” “trade,” and “Foreign Direct Investment” 
(“FDI”).
5
The unique forms of Chinese state involvement in cross-border com-
mercial activity pose probing questions about the sustainability and rele-
vance of incumbent, “rules-based” frameworks governing the global econ-
omy.
6
Commentators writing in fields as diverse as international trade, 
technology, and intellectual property have noted that the unique nature of 
Chinese political economy and its interface with global markets carry deep-
ly disruptive potential for established transnational governance regimes.
7
Yet notwithstanding the intense scholarly dialogue that China’s emergence 
as a major development financier—sub-Saharan Africa’s largest—has gen-
erated in other, cognate fields, there has been scant legal analysis of this 
phenomenon.
8
We only have an emergent understanding, for example, of 
the precise contractual mechanisms used in RFI transactions
9
and of their 
oil, natural gas, and certain mineral sectors as “strategic,” and describing the special corporate 
governance rules that attach to such a designation); Mohan & Tay-Mullins, supra note 2, at 
1372–74 (China’s “diplomatic agenda” shapes its commercial engagements with developing 
countries, particularly in the energy, minerals, and infrastructure sectors). 
4. UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, AFRICA-BRICS
COOPERATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION IN AFRICA iii (2013), https://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/
10855/22120/b10693683.pdf [hereinafter AFRICA-BRICS COOPERATION].
5. Raphael Kaplinsky & Mike Morris, Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging
with Large Dragons, 21 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 551, 561 (2009).
6. Cf. Wu, supra note 1, at 266 (2016) (arguing that the “China, Inc.” style of political 
economy poses fundamental challenges to the current WTO, which may “weaken the institu-
tion” over time).
7. See id. at 300–08 (arguing that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism may not be 
able to adequately address unique trade-distortive effects arising out of Chinese economic 
structures and practices); JAMES LEWIS, CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION IN CYBERSPACE 49–50
(2013); Christina Skinner, An International Law Response to Economic Cyber Espionage, 46 
CONN. L. REV. 1165 (2014). 
8. See Suzanne Siu, Note, The Sovereign-Commercial Hybrid: Chinese Minerals for 
Infrastructure Financing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 48 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 599, 602 (2010) (“Though China’s emergence as Africa’s largest trade part-
ner and prominent financier has generated abundant literature, legal issues are noted only tan-
gentially, and individual case studies remain rare.”).
9. One reason for this partial understanding is that many of the contractual documents 
underlying RFI transactions (and Chinese commercial engagements with developing countries 
more broadly) are typically shrouded in secrecy. See Mohan & Tay-Mullins, supra note 2, at 
1375 (noting methodological limitations of their study due to incomplete knowledge of the 
“details” of the relevant contracts), 1380 (noting that certain lawmakers of the Cambodia Na-
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interface with incumbent forms of international economic legal govern-
ance.
10
Moreover, the extant scholarship examining Chinese RFI has largely 
focused on RFI within the context of FDI,
11
when the full impact of RFI 
agreements—both their economic and legal implications—can only be un-
derstood in the broader context of sovereign finance. “Sovereign finance,” 
in my usage here, is a capacious term that includes “investment finance,” 
“sovereign debt,” and other pathways that developing states might use to 
engage in state-driven economic development.
12
The term recognizes that 
states seeking to leverage their natural resource endowments to produce 
economic development, including infrastructure expansion, are confronted 
with a range of options beyond merely inviting private-sector FDI.
Such states might, for example, borrow money from a banking syndi-
cate, issue debt securities on global capital markets, receive bilateral devel-
opment loans and/or aid, enter into a joint venture with a foreign multina-
tional under an FDI regime, negotiate concessional financing arrangements 
from a multilateral body like the World Bank or International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”), or any combination of the foregoing.
13
These pathways are 
tional Assembly opposed the Chinese-financed Kamchay Dam project because “they had not 
actually seen the terms of the contract”). The Sicomines Agreement thus represents a compel-
ling case study for legal analysis of Chinese-origin RFI transactions in part because its text, 
including a subsequent amendment, are publicly available.
10. Cf. Siu, supra note 8, at 602.
11. See Won Kidane, China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties with African States in 
Comparative Context, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 141, 142 (2016) (arguing that “the principal 
legal instruments that govern China-Africa investment relations are Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties (‘BITs’),” which govern FDI). But, as this note argues, contract and transactional struc-
ture remain under-theorized methods of transnational economic governance. Cf. Luke Sper-
duto, Can Human Development Bonds Reduce the Agency Costs of the Resource Curse?, 12 
L. & DEV. REV. 191, 196 (2019) (“[C]ontract design remains an underexplored tool for ad-
dressing the challenges and opportunities of the new sovereign debt market.”).
12. See infra Part II.C (noting the Sicomines Agreement combines various elements of 
extant modes of sovereign finance); infra note 14 (noting the economic and legal interplay 
between various pathways of sovereign finance); infra note 40 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the “spectrum” of financing choices available to sovereign states to develop national 
infrastructure); cf. Patrick Bolton, Debt and Money: Financial Constraints and Sovereign Fi-
nance, 71 J. FIN. 1483 (2016) (arguing for a more holistic conception of “sovereign finance”
than sovereign debt within the economic literature).
13. See APEC/OECD, FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE IN APEC ECONOMIES:
APEC/OECD REPORT ON SELECTED EFFECTIVE APPROACHES, 13–16 (2019) (comparing and 
contrasting the “diversity of financing options” for infrastructure development and noting pos-
sibility of “blended finance approaches”) [hereinafter APEC/OECD Report]; Deborah 
Bräutigam, Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How Much?, in
RISING CHINA: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 203, 203–04 (Jane Golley & 
Ligang Song eds., 2011) (describing the “many different kinds of flows” that make up the “in-
ternational financial architecture”); see also MAURO MEGLIANI, SOVEREIGN DEBT:
GENESIS—RESTRUCTURING—LITIGATION 165–98 (on syndicated sovereign loans), 205–33
(on issuing bonded debt), 97–109 (on bilateral debt), 123–56 (on multilateral and concessional 
finance) (2015). Policymakers in developing states also see promoting FDI as an alternative or 
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subject to a series of dynamic interactions, which further nuance the sover-
eign financing picture and invite more holistic analysis.
14
Thus, viewing RFI 
within the comprehensive context of sovereign development finance pro-
vides a more robust framework for assessing the rise and internal logic of 
Chinese-origin RFI transactions, in large part because such transactions 
combine elements of extant financing pathways to produce a meaningful al-
ternative to FDI alone.
The 2008 Sicomines Agreement between the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (“DRC”) and various Chinese corporate entities, which combines a 
$3 billion USD infrastructure development package with a mineral extrac-
tion joint-venture project, presents a rare case study for assessing the trans-
national legal implications of Chinese RFI deals across sub-Saharan Afri-
ca.
15
This note contends that the Sicomines Agreement’s transactional 
structure and its relationship to the incumbent international legal frame-
works surrounding sovereign finance—from contractual mechanisms to 
endgame scenarios involving restructuring and litigation—operationalize 
the “disruptive” potential of Chinese-origin finance for such “rules-based” 
regimes. It demonstrates that the Sicomines Agreement selectively draws on 
and integrates pre-existing modes of sovereign development finance—but in 
ways that subvert the extant legal and customary frameworks those modes 
have depended on.
supplement to state-led, debt-financed development; for this reason, I include it here. See
APEC/OECD Report, at 14; Laura Alfaro et al., FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Lo-
cal Financial Markets, 64 J. INT’L ECON. 89, 90 (2004) (noting that policymakers in develop-
ing countries increasingly substituted FDI for sovereign debt to promote development goals in 
the wake of the 1980s debt crisis, which negatively impacted the availability of sovereign 
lending).
14. An emerging corpus of development economics literature has explored the econom-
ic relationships between sovereign credit, FDI, and economic growth. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER 
W. CROWE ET AL., MACROFINANCIAL LINKAGES: TRENDS, CRISES, AND POLICIES (2010);
Monika Schnitzer, Debt v. Foreign Direct Investment: The Impact of Sovereign Risk on the 
Structure of International Capital Flows, 69 ECONOMICA 41 (2002); Miguel Fuentes & Diego 
Saravia, Sovereign Defaulters: Do International Capital Markets Punish Them?, 91 J. DEV.
ECON. 336 (2010); Lilia Maliar et al., Sovereign Risk, FDI Spillovers, and Growth, 16 REV.
INT’L ECON. 463 (2008). Additionally, the corresponding legal regimes have overlapped and 
intersected in a number of ways. For example, although much sovereign debt is currently pri-
vately-held, default often triggers the intervention of multilateral institutions like the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (“IMF”) through sovereign debt restructuring (“SDR”). MEGLIANI, su-
pra note 13, at 252 (arguing that IMF involvement remains a common principle of sovereign 
debt restructuring). Additionally, recent debt crises have triggered interplay between the SDR 
and investor-state arbitration legal regimes. See Ellie Norton, International Investment Arbi-
tration and the European Debt Crisis, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 291 (2012). The Sicomines Agree-
ment potentially amplifies and/or nuances these regime interactions. See infra Part IV.B.1.
15. See supra note 9. See generally Andoni Maiza-Larrarte & Gloria Claudio-Quiroga, 
The Impact of Sicomines on Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 95 INT’L
AFFAIRS 423 (2019) (describing and contextualizing the main characteristics of the agree-
ment).
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China’s intervention within the sovereign finance framework challenges 
fundamental assumptions embedded in the design and logic of its rules-
based architecture. First, China’s “strategic integration” of different forms 
of sovereign finance subverts the longstanding trend of separating their bi-
lateral aid, privately-held sovereign debt, trade, and FDI vectors.
16
A set of 
distinct, transnational legal rules has traditionally governed the workings of 
each mode of sovereign finance, albeit in sometimes subtler and less bind-
ing ways than the WTO’s rules have governed international trade, for ex-
ample.
17
FDI sits within a well-established body of international investment 
law—itself a mix of customary international law, a global network of trea-
ties, and decisions from international tribunals.
18
Privately-held debt is gov-
erned by domestic, or municipal, law—almost universally English and New 
York State law.
19
Publicly-held bilateral debt, by contrast, is often controlled 
by public international law, and the Paris Club, an informal forum of credi-
tor countries, coordinates responses to restructuring requests.
20
At the multi-
lateral level, almost all major international financial institutions (“IFIs”) 
have longstanding operating procedures on issuing and restructuring sover-
eign debt, often defined in their founding treaties or charters, and their inter-
actions with states are further shaped by customary and normative frame-
works.
21
16. Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 5, at 560–61.
17. See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—and Not 
Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 623–24 (2010) (comparing the different institutional designs 
underlying the legal regimes governing international finance and international trade and not-
ing that the latter encompasses rules largely codified through “hard law”).
18. See generally OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING 
CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS (2008) [hereinafter OECD Guide to IIL].
19. See MEGLIANI supra note 13, at 190 (for syndicated loans) and 225 (for bonded 
debt).
20. See generally id. at 277–307.
21. See generally John W. Head, Law and Policy in International Financial Institu-
tions: The Changing Role of Law in the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks, 17 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 194 (2007). IFIs, in addition to states, may also be formal subjects of 
international law. To the extent that financing agreements exist among states or between a 
host state and an international organization, these agreements are themselves treaties under 
public international law, whose interpretation is shaped by the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (“VCLT”) or its 1986 extension, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, 
which although not in force remains influential. See MEGLIANI, supra note 13, at 123–25. 
Additionally, international “soft law”—for instance in the form of the Basel regulations’ sov-
ereign debt risk weightings, or the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s Principles 
on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing—exerts pervasive influence 
throughout the sovereign finance ecosystem. See generally Brummer, supra note 17. Finally, 
IFIs themselves create far-reaching normative governance frameworks. See generally Jan 
Wouters & Jed Odermatt, Comparing the ‘Four Pillars’ of Global Economic Governance: A 
Critical Analysis of the Institutional Design of the FSB, IMF, World Bank, and WTO, 17 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 49 (2014). Taken together, this decentralized web of transnational rules forms 
part of the “rules-based” architecture of the global economy. See id. at 53.
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By combining its investment pathways in this way, China undercuts the 
normative practice of determining the applicable legal regime based on the 
nature and identity of the investor and the transactional structure of the in-
vestment.
22
The legal regime for FDI, for example, assumes a sovereign host 
state and private investors.
23
On the other hand, the Paris Club forum pre-
supposes sovereign (i.e. public) creditors, while concessional finance is 
most frequently funded by IFIs.
24
By contrast, Chinese RFI deals involve the 
strategic “bundling” or integration of several transactional pathways in 
which the Chinese state and its SOEs perform a range of sovereign finance 
roles: FDI investor (large Chinese state-owned industrial firms), sovereign 
creditor (China’s EXIM Bank), and funder of bilateral public aid (the Chi-
nese state).
25
As such, adjudicators have struggled to identify the appropriate 
legal regime to apply to the Chinese RFI deals, raising uncertainties over 
whether existing law can adequately capture the deals’ underlying economic 
dynamics.
26
Second, the financing terms and structure of Chinese RFI transactions 
clash with practical and normative aspects of existing forms of development 
finance, particularly those issued from IFIs. For example, by guaranteeing a 
multi-billion U.S. dollar development finance offer for infrastructure and 
mining developing from the China EXIM Bank on quasi-commercial terms, 
the DRC violated its pre-existing commitments to the IMF against incurring 
additional sovereign or sovereign-guaranteed debt.
27
Only through tortuous 
negotiations throughout 2007 and 2009 was the DRC able to participate in 
both the IMF’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”) debt relief pro-
gram and the Sicomines Agreement.
28
Indeed, the Sicomines Agreement ap-
pears to be the first instance in which an HIPC participant contracted addi-
tional market-based debt outside the IMF framework.
29
By ignoring the 
22. See OECD Guide to IIL, supra note 18, at 8 (“The definition[s] of investor and in-
vestment are among the key elements determining the scope of application of rights and obli-
gations under international investment agreements.”); MEGLIANI, supra note 13, at 4 (“The 
notion of State debt generally includes debts owed, guaranteed, or secured by a sovereign 
State or an agency or instrumentality thereof.”).
23. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
24. See MEGLIANI, supra note 13, at 123–25, 277–85. Concessional finance, broadly 
speaking, refers to development finance extended on non-market, i.e. “concessional” terms. 
See infra Part II.A.3 (defining concessional finance and discussing its hallmarks); see also 
infra Part III.B.1 (discussing legal issues arising from its definition in the IMF-sponsored debt 
restructuring context). 
25. See id.; Siu, supra note 8, at 619–29.
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See Bräutigam, supra note 13 at 213; Johanna Malm, When Chinese Development 
Finance Met the IMF’s Public Debt Norm in DR Congo 144 (2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Roskilde University) (on file with author).
28. Id.; see also infra Part III.B.1 and notes therein.
29. Although Sierra Leone, another HIPC participant, appears to have opened negotia-
tions with China in around 2005–06, see BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 2 at 144–45, Johanna Malm 
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IMF’s requirements, China and its counterparties to the Sicomines Agree-
ment contested the IMF’s preeminence within sovereign debt restructuring 
(“SDR”) and development policy, raising questions about the normative 
“consensus” the IMF and other Bretton Woods institutions represent for the 
global economy.
30
This note approaches these questions by unpacking the process, meth-
od, and structure of Chinese RFI financing transactions, using the Sicomines 
Agreement as a case study. Immediately following this introduction, Part II 
explains how the Agreement is a product of the traditional ecosystem of 
sovereign finance’s limitations in meeting the DRC’s development needs 
and the uniqueness of China’s political economy. It sketches the Sicomines 
Agreement’s structure in light of the niche it attempts to fill, showing that 
the Agreement selectively draws from and integrates key aspects of extant 
sovereign finance pathways. Part III explores the Sicomines Agreement’s 
interface with international economic law: To what extent can incumbent 
legal and customary rules capture the sui generis transactional mechanisms 
at play in the Sicomines Agreement? It divides this analysis into two parts: 
(A) areas of the Sicomines Agreement that the extant framework adequately 
captures; and (B) elements of the transaction that subvert that framework, 
confounding existing rules. Finally, Part IV presents a more holistic analy-
sis, proposing two axes along which stakeholders and policymakers might 
think about the systemic impacts of such agreements.
II. Explaining the Genesis and Structure of the 
Sicomines Agreement
In 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo elected Joseph Kabila as 
President.
31
The election, which came less than three years after the official 
end of the DRC’s second civil war, was the country’s first democratic elec-
tion in over four decades. Running on a “Cinq Chantiers” (“Five Public 
Works”) campaign pledge, Kabila promised to deliver infrastructure, job 
creation, education, water, and electricity.
32
Yet, his administration inherited 
a staggering debt burden of $13.1 billion USD (owed to an array of credi-
has argued that the Sicomines Agreement represents an unprecedented challenge to the condi-
tionality norm associated with the HIPC program. See Malm, supra note 27, at 148–63. 
30. See Malm, supra note 27, at ii–iii. See generally Ayse Kaya & Mike Reay, How 
Did the Washington Consensus Move within the IMF? Fragmented Change from the 1980s to 
the Aftermath of the 2008 Crisis, 26 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 284 (2019) (discussing the evolv-
ing role of the IMF as a “disseminator” of the Washington Consensus, a controversial set of 
development policy prescriptions).
31. LE MONDE, Joseph Kabila Prête Serment sur Fond de Combats dans l’est du Con-
go (Dec. 6, 2006), https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2006/12/06/joseph-kabila-prete-
serment-sur-fond-de-combats-dans-l-est-du-congo_842761_3212.html (French). 
32. RADIO FRANÇAISE INTERNATIONALE, Les Chantiers de Kabila (May 12, 2006), 
http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/084/article_47988.asp (French).  
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tors)
33
and devastation wrought by decades of civil war.
34
This environment 
made further sovereign debt financing, either on international capital mar-
kets or through bilateral channels, almost impossible. Despite this, the DRC 
government had won $3 billion USD of funds from the Chinese towards 
landmark infrastructure projects by 2008.
35
Faced with a seemingly intracta-
ble financial situation, how did Kabila and DRC state officials obtain this 
financing for the Cinq Chantiers program? The answer came in the form of 
the Sicomines Agreement, an unprecedented financing package whose 
terms specifically addressed these historical limitations.
The historical, political, and economic contexts of the Sicomines 
Agreement shaped its transactional structure. Section A argues that tradi-
tional pathways of sovereign finance—debt capital markets, FDI, aid, and 
concessional finance—presented challenging, if not intractable, obstacles to 
the delivery of necessary infrastructure development to the DRC’s heavily 
indebted, fragmentary post-war economy. Section B identifies the unique 
characteristics of the Chinese system of political economy, or “China, Inc.,” 
that China leverages to develop packages like the Sicomines Agreement that 
address key shortcomings of traditional sovereign finance pathways. Section 
C analyzes how these factors together explain the mechanics and structure 
of the Sicomines Agreement.
A. Historical Constraints on Infrastructure and 
Resource Development in DRC
Kabila’s Cinq Chantiers program sought to address the desperate infra-
structure situation in the DRC at the close of its civil war. Decades of con-
flict had seriously damaged most infrastructure networks and left many re-
maining assets, including the nation’s incomplete road and rail networks, in 
deteriorating condition.
36
Its power grid delivered electricity to just 15% of 
DRC’s population.
37
In all, the World Bank estimated that these infrastruc-
tural deficits accounted for about 40% of the productivity gap facing the 
DRC’s private sector with respect to the United Nation’s Millennium De-
velopment Goals.
38
To catch up to the rest of the developing world, the 
33. IMF Press Release, IMF Executive Board Approves US$551 Million PRGF Ar-
rangement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and US$73 Million in Interim HIPC 
Assistance, IMF Press Release 09/455 (Dec. 11, 2009), https://www.imf.org/en/News/
Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr09455.
34. See Armin Rosen, The Origins of War in the DRC, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/the-origins-of-war-in-the-
drc/277131.
35. Siu, supra note 8, at 601.
36. Vivien Foster & Daniel Alberto Benitez, The Democratic Republic of Congo’s In-
frastructure: A Continental Perspective 1–4 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 5602, 2011).
37. Maiza-Larrarte & Claudio-Quiroga, supra note 15 at 444.
38. Foster & Benitez, supra note 36 at 3.
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World Bank estimated that the DRC needed to plug a $5.3 billion USD per 
year infrastructure financing gap.
39
Each of the established pathways for de-
velopment finance within the extant sovereign finance ecosystem, howev-




1. Debt Capital Markets and Private Syndicated Lending
While many states directly finance infrastructure development out of 
their fiscs, tapping global debt capital markets to overcome the difference 
between extraordinary expenditure and normal revenue,
41
practical and legal 
constraints prevented the DRC from doing so following Kabila’s election.
Practically, the DRC’s financial situation from 2006 to 2007 exhibited near-
ly all factors economists describe as inhibiting market access:
42
a high debt 
burden;
43
a recent sovereign default;
44
vulnerability to cyclicality and exoge-
nous shocks due to reliance on highly variable mineral pricing;
45
poor gov-
erning institutions and rule of law;
46
and prior participation in the IMF’s 
39. Id. at 1 (noting that “business as usual” would lead to an infrastructure gap lasting 
for at least a century).
40. See generally APEC/OECD Report, supra note 13; OECD, FOSTERING 
INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE 20 (2015) (noting a “spectrum” of financing structures 
from traditional public procurement, including sovereign debt-financing, to partial and fully 
privatized investment, including FDI-financed) [hereinafter OECD Fostering Investment Re-
port]. 
41. Indonesia, for example, recently raised approximately U.S. $2.5 billion in two yen-
denominated sovereign issuances in 2017 and 2019 to fund its infrastructure development 
program. Wataru Suzuki, Indonesia to Raise $900M in Samurai Bonds, NIKKEI ASIAN REV.
(May 31, 2017 1:25 PM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Indonesia-to-raise-900m-in-
samurai-bonds; Jun Suzuki, Indonesia Readies One of Asia’s Biggest Samurai Bond Issuanc-
es, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (May 17, 2019 12:07 PM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/
Indonesia-readies-one-of-Asia-s-biggest-samurai-bond-issuances.
42. R. Gaston Gelos et al., Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What De-
termines Market Access?, 23 (IMF Working Paper WP/04/221, 2004).
43. International Monetary Fund [“IMF”], Democratic Republic of the Congo: 2007 
Article IV Consultation—Staff Report 11, 19 (IMF Country Report No. 07/327, 2007) (noting 
that the DRC’s total external public debt burden, inclusive of IMF obligations, stood at ap-
proximately U.S. $10.8 billion in 2006 and that its debt position was in distress) [hereinafter 
IMF 2007 Art. IV Consultation].
44. Id. at 5 (noting that the DRC failed to service parts of its sovereign debt in 2006).
45. Id. at 1 (noting that the DRC’s fiscal situation would “worsen in the event of ad-
verse exogenous shocks”); IMF, Request for the Rapid-Access Component of the Exogenous 
Shocks Facility and Report on the 2008 Staff-Monitored Program 12 (IMF Country Report 
No. 09/317, 2009) (noting that the “exogenous shocks” of falling commodities prices and the 
Global Financial Crisis were “likely to give rise to large fiscal and balance of payments fi-
nancing gaps in 2009”).
46. Siu, supra note 8, at 609 (“[C]orruption and poor governance records have stymied 
the DRC’s attempts to secure additional sovereign loans, foreign aid and even IMF debt re-
lief.”).
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Poverty Reduction and Growth facility.
47
Additionally, the DRC faced a le-
gal obstacle: It had covenanted against the “contracting of nonconcessional 
debt” by acceding to various IMF debt-relief programs, creating a de jure
prohibition on incurring private debt on open market terms.
48
The DRC thus 
could neither issue sovereign bonds in international capital markets nor as-
sume privately syndicated, market-basis loans to fund its infrastructure de-
velopment.
49
2. Foreign Direct Investment and Public-Private Partnerships
FDI can facilitate infrastructure development through several mecha-
nisms. FDI enables states to trade foreign ownership over their infrastruc-
ture for direct foreign funding of the same, for example. In the DRC, outside 
investors financed some infrastructure developments directly, but because 
foreign investors expect returns on their investment, these projects were of-
ten limited to consistently cash-producing investments such as telecommu-
nications.
50
States can also leverage FDI to indirectly promote infrastructure devel-
opment, including by taxing profitable investment projects (such as in re-
source extraction) to fund unrelated infrastructure projects, or by compelling 
FDI-participating companies to contribute to the infrastructure used by their 
investments.
51
The DRC could not reliably leverage this paradigm, however, 
since it was limited by the low total volume of inbound investment.
52
Although the DRC’s unparalleled natural resource endowment provided 
an attractive FDI target,
53
and although the DRC engaged some FDI to im-
47. See IMF, IMF Completes Third Review Under the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’s Program Supported by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) Ar-
rangement and Approves US$39 Million Disbursement, IMF Press Release 04/44 (Mar. 4, 
2004), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr0444.
48. Malm, supra note 27, at 92, 151.
49. See Siu, supra note 8, at 609.
50. World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy for the Democratic Republic of Congo 
for the Period FY08-FY11, Vol. 1, 6 (Report No. 41474-ZR, 2007) [hereinafter World Bank 
2007 CAF]. 
51. Glen Robbins & David Perkins, Mining FDI and Infrastructure Development on 
Africa’s East Coast: Examining the Recent Experience of Tanzania and Mozambique, 24 J.
INT’L DEV. 220, 226 (2012) (“Governments have also seen mining as contributing to infra-
structure indirectly through the contributions to the fiscus, which has been relatively signifi-
cant in many countries with very low rates of revenue collection. Infrastructure can also be 
seen to impact on forward and backward linkages.”).
52. Compare IMF 2007 Art. IV Consultation, supra note 43, at 24 (noting the DRC’s
estimated 2006 FDI of approximately U.S. $263 million), with Foster & Benitez, supra note 
36, at 24 (describing the scale of infrastructure investment requirements).
53. See World Bank 2007 CAF, supra note 50 at 6 (new investment in the DRC in the 
2003–2007 period often reflected “the private sector’s interest in the country’s immense natu-
ral resources”). 
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prove its physical infrastructure,
54
structural limitations prevented FDI from 
substantially plugging the DRC’s substantial infrastructure gap. First, the 
benefits of FDI for host country growth appear to require pre-existing work-
ing infrastructure,
55
lacking in the DRC. Second, effective governance insti-
tutions, such as property rights and the rule of law, are thought to condition 
FDI growth,
56
but were viewed as lacking in the DRC.
57
Third, corruption 
and weak negotiating leverage prevented the DRC from translating its FDI 
into meaningful economic development.
58
As the IMF indicated, inbound 
FDI would likely be insufficient to cover much more than a small propor-
tion of the DRC’s annual $5.3 billion USD infrastructure gap—even assum-
ing the DRC enacted governance reforms and was able to efficiently convert 
FDI value into infrastructure growth.
59
3. Aid and Concessional Finance
Concessional finance—direct aid and non-commercial loans coordinat-
ed by the World Bank and regional developmental institutions—is often a 
lifeline for infrastructure improvement in the poorest, most underdeveloped 
countries. This type of financing is less sensitive to the political risks and 
pre-existing infrastructure gaps that might impede private sector financing, 
since its very aim is often to improve those factors.
60
Moreover, concession-
al financing deals need not be structured on commercial terms, so they need 
not implicate the IMF’s subsequent debt covenants.
61
Concessional financing, however, lacks the liquidity to meet DRC’s 
needs; its benefits are counterbalanced by a severely limited pool of capital. 
Concessional finance institutions like the World Bank and regional devel-
opment banks candidly admit that they simply lack funds to finance all of 
54. See Foster & Benitez, supra note 36, at 24 (noting “modest” pre-existing invest-
ment).
55. Farrokh Nourzad et al., The Interaction Between FDI and Infrastructure Capital in 
the Development Process, 20 INT’L ADVANCES ECON. RES. 203, 210 (2014).
56. Andrew Ross, Governance Infrastructure and FDI Flows in Developing Countries,
11 TRANSNAT’L CORP. REV. 109, 112 (2019).
57. Siu, supra note 8, at 609.
58. See Rebecca Bream, A Bid for Front-line Command in Africa, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 8, 
2007), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eec69b16-8d6e-11dc-a398-0000779fd2ac.html (noting that 
large foreign investors interested in the DRC were “deterred by the country’s lack of infra-
structure and widespread corruption”); Barry Sergeant, Nikanor’s DRC Mining Contract 
Quandary, MINEWEB (Apr. 3, 2007 11:07 AM), https://archive.md/20150405104550/
http://www.mineweb.com/archive/nikanors-drc-mining-contract-quandary; cf. Ross, supra
note 56, at 112.
59. See IMF 2007 Art. IV Consultation, supra note 43, at 24 (projecting FDI to reach 
only slightly over U.S. $1 billion by 2012).
60. See generally MEGLIANI, supra note 13, at 123–57 (describing the genesis of multi-
lateral institution-financed sovereign debt).
61. Id.; see also Malm, supra note 27, at 4.
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the viable project proposals they review.
62
Unsurprisingly, these trends also 
played out in the DRC: Total aid and concessional finance inflows were es-




In sum, existing pathways to infrastructure development did not offer 
the DRC a viable path to obtaining the $5.3 billion USD that it needed each 
year to fill its infrastructure financing gap. The large amounts of liquidity 
available on global markets remained out of the DRC’s reach, due to its 
governance characteristics, limited infrastructure, and financial history. 
These factors similarly limited its access to FDI as a means to improving 
infrastructure. Finally, aid and concessional finance could not supply more 
than a small fraction of the funds the DRC required to meaningfully ad-
vance its infrastructure development goals.
B. Leveraging China’s Unique Political Economy
Into this challenging financing ecosystem stepped the Chinese state and 
its subsidiaries. Over the past fifteen years, China has overtaken the United 
States and other Western countries as sub-Saharan Africa’s largest trading 
partner and most significant bilateral financier—patterns reflected in its re-
lationship with the DRC.
64
At a cursory glance, it might appear that China’s 
activity in sub-Saharan Africa merely reflects its overall economic might. It 
comes as little surprise, in other words, that the world’s second largest 
economy has commercial links across the world commensurate with its size. 
Yet, as some scholars have noted, there is something qualitatively different 
about China’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa
65
—differences embodied 
in the Sicomines Agreement and that, as this note argues, carry legal conse-
quences.
The differences between Chinese and Global North cross-border eco-
nomic activity arise in large part out of China’s unique political-economic 
system. Existing conceptual paradigms like “state capitalism,” “socialism,” 
or “free market economy” do not adequately capture the Chinese system’s 
unique characteristics; rather, Chinese political economy is best described as 
62. Indeed, the World Bank estimated this deficit to be approximately U.S. $1 trillion 
globally in 2018. See James Kynge & Oliver Ralph, World Bank Group Helps Plug Infra-
structure Investment Gap, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/fd749a72-
26d9-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0.
63. World Bank 2007 CAF, supra note 50, at 11.
64. See Siu, supra note 8, at 602.
65. See e.g., id. at 608 (“China’s overwhelming gains in trade and outward foreign di-
rect investment (OFDI) with Africa cannot be explained by economic clout alone.”); 
Bräutigam supra note 13, at 752–53 (arguing that Chinese development finance in Africa may 
not be adequately described by existing standards and definitions).
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a system in which the “party-state remains all-powerful, but private enter-
prise drives significant economic activity.”
66
Several elements of China’s 
political economy enabled Chinese entities to strategically bundle inputs to 
produce the Sicomines Agreement: consolidated ownership of corporate en-
tities; centralized influence over the allocation of capital; coordination of 
economic planning and inputs; and Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) in-
fluence over key management.
1. Corporate Ownership: SASAC as the Chinese State’s 
Corporate Holding Entity
China’s State-controlled Assets Supervision and Administration Com-
mission of the State Council (“SASAC”) owns a wide swathe of Chinese 
corporate entities, allowing the Chinese state to leverage some of the largest 
companies in the world for its national interest.
67
While a strong SOE pres-
ence within a national economy is not unusual, the scale and, more im-
portantly, centralization of SASAC’s state corporate ownership is unprece-
dented.
68
Although a substantial number of Chinese SOEs were privatized or 
otherwise spun off in 1997, SASAC still owns more than half of China’s 
Fortune 500 companies, especially in “critical sectors” such as energy, rail, 
shipbuilding, and telecommunications.
69
SASAC often actively manages 
these portfolio companies, much as private equity firms treat their spon-
sored companies.
70
Rather than act as a state sponsor for “national champi-
ons,” however, SASAC often promotes market forces, including competi-
tion between its own portfolio companies—processes that have generated 
enormous economic growth in China.
71
The touchstone of this active man-
agement is not pure profit but the “Chinese state’s interest, broadly de-
66. Wu, supra note 1, at 270; see also Osburg, supra note 1; Zheng & Milhaupt, supra
note 1.
67. See Wu, supra note 1, at 270–73.
68. Id. at 271; see also Marcos Aguiar et al., SASAC: China’s Megashareholder,
BCG PERSPECTIVES (Dec. 1, 2007), https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/
globalization_strategy_sasac_chinas_megashareholder.
69. Wu, supra note 1, at 272 (“Imagine if one U.S. government agency controlled Gen-
eral Electric, General Motors, Ford, Boeing, U.S. Steel, DuPont, AT&T, Verizon, Honeywell, 
and United Technologies . . . . It could hire and fire management, deploy and transfer re-
sources across holding companies, and generate synergies across its holdings. While the West 
may once have marveled at Japan’s powerful Ministry of Information Trade and Industry 
(‘MITI’) in its heyday, SASAC’s grip over the Chinese economy today is even more direct 
and all encompassing.”). Additionally, there are sub-national SASACs that further extend 
sovereign ownership of assets in the Chinese economy. Id. (“Each level of government repli-
cates this structure. Provinces and municipalities have their own SASAC, reporting up to the 
central government’s SASAC, and these local agencies serve as the controlling shareholders 
of the critical SOEs in their regions.”).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 271–72.
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fined.”
72
Significantly for this analysis, SASAC owns two of the three Chi-





2. Centralized Capital Allocation: The Central Huijin’s Control of 
Chinese Financial Institutions
Formally constituted under the Chinese state’s sovereign wealth fund, 
the Central Huijin is to China’s financial institutions what SASAC is to 
China’s large blue-chip corporations.
75
Through its control of Chinese fi-
nancial institutions, it has enormous sums at its disposal: These Chinese fi-
nancial institutions include, among them, the four largest banks in the world 
by assets.
76
Even where the Central Huijin is not the controlling shareholder 
in a financial institution, it facilitates debt and shareholding structures that 
allow the state to retain tight control over commercial and investment 
banks
77
and directs the allocation of capital to serve its policy objectives.
78
In 2009, it controlled the equivalent of over $2 trillion USD in foreign cur-
rency reserves.
79
From 2007 to 2009, the Central Huijin used a series of currency reserve 
transfers and bond issuances to inject over $32 billion in capital into the 
China Development Bank and the Chinese EXIM Bank
80
—coinciding with 
72. Id.; Barry Naughton, SASAC Rising, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Apr. 2005, at 
9, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/clm14_bn.pdf.
73. Directory, State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission of the 
State Council [“SASAC”], http://en.sasac.gov.cn/directorynames.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2020) [hereinafter SASAC Directory]. POWERCHINA, Corporate Profile,
https://en.powerchina.cn//2019-05/23/content_16651992.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
74. SASAC Directory, supra note 73. Note that Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Co., Ltd., the 
third Chinese signatory, is not owned by SASAC but rather is a publicly-traded company 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. REUTERS, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Co. Ltd. Compa-
ny Profile, https://www.reuters.com/companies/603799.SS (last visited May 18, 2020).
75. Wu, supra note 1, at 273–74 (“The closest analogue would be if . . . the U.S. Treas-
ury Department set up a single government entity to act as the controlling shareholder of 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, and Wells Fargo.”).
76. Id. (“Through Central Huijin and other financial vehicles, the Chinese state has a 
larger pool of financial resources at its direct disposal than any other comparable government 
in the world.”).
77. Wu, supra note 1, at 274–75.
78. Id.
79. Currency Contortions, ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.economist.com/
displayStory.cfm?story_id=15127500.
80. REUTERS, China Huijin to Recapitalise Exim Bank Soon—Media (Nov. 12, 2009), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-exim-huijin/china-huijin-to-recapitalise-exim-bank-
soon-media-idUSPEK13684620091112 (noting the “unusual” nature of the bond issuance re-
capitalization mechanism for the EXIM Bank capital injection).
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a wave of development finance transactions across sub-Saharan Africa, in-
cluding the Sicomines Agreement.
81
3. Economic Coordination: The NRDC’s Control of 
Planning and Inputs
The Chinese state does not just control assets but also coordinates eco-
nomic activity across sectors through its National Development and Reform 
Commission (“NDRC”).
82
The NRDC reports directly to the State Council 
and has a uniquely wide-ranging economic policymaking mandate, enabling 
it to coordinate policy objectives in the economic sphere.
83
While many oth-
er countries have central economic policy entities (such as the National 
Economic Council in the United States), the NRDC’s policymaking scope 
and power are much larger: It sets the prices of commodities like electricity, 
oil, natural gas, and water, allowing it to control a wide range of industry 
costs,
84
and it approves all large investment projects, enabling it to affect 
market supply, capacity, and the allocation of investment capital.
85
4. Chinese Communist Party’s Management of Personnel Decisions
Even corporations not directly under SASAC’s control are influenced 
by the Chinese Communist Party, which works to align their activities with 
the interests of the party-state.
86
While the dominant political party is syn-
onymous with the state in some authoritarian countries, the Chinese Com-
munist Party is simultaneously an institution independent of the state and a 
body with ultimate authority over state decisions.
87
This creates a “dual-
track” system of governance.
88
In the economic sphere, the CCP controls 
appointment and promotion in both official state organs, such as the 
SASAC, Central Huijin, and NDRC, and also in private sector entities (in-
cluding entities not otherwise owned by SASAC or another state body), 
aligning ambitious individuals’ career incentives with the CCP’s interests 
and objectives.
89
In this way, the party-state does not need to own a corpo-
rate entity through SASAC or Central Huijin to leverage those assets for its
interests.
90
81. BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 2, at 145–48 (noting other RFI deals in Sierra Leone and 
Angola during this period).
82. Wu, supra note 1, at 275–76.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 276.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 280.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 281.
90. Id. For example, it is probable that even though SASAC does not own Zhejiang 
Huayou Cobalt Co., Ltd., the third Chinese signatory to the Sicomines Agreement, the CCP 
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Together, these four features of the Chinese political-economic system 
enable the Chinese party-state to create unprecedented finance, investment, 
aid, and trade packages. Specifically, the party-state is able to coordinate the 
salient features of existing sovereign finance pathways while avoiding their 
practical weaknesses. Because market growth and competition in China 
have generated huge economic activity and capital accumulation rivaling 
that found in global financial markets, liquidity is not a substantial limit on 
Chinese investment. At the same time, the party-state’s influence over eco-
nomic decisions means that China can override the singular focus on risk-
adjusted return maximization fundamental to traditional, market-based 
sources of sovereign finance.
91
Indeed, the Chinese party-state uses many 
levers to direct Chinese corporate entities’ economic activity towards state 
objectives.
92
Finally, government ownership and party control of large cor-
porate entities enables the party-state to coordinate its economic actions 
across sectors and modalities.
93
Collectively, these tools enable innovative 
transactional structures in cross-border investments at scale.
C.  The Structure and Mechanics of the Sicomines Agreement
The Sicomines Agreement, a commercial agreement between represent-
atives of the DRC and SASAC-owned Chinese enterprises, displays the in-
terface between the DRC’s infrastructure financing needs and Chinese enti-
ties’ unique abilities to meet them. The Agreement selectively draws on and 
bundles incumbent pathways of sovereign finance in innovative and subver-
sive ways, overcoming the limitations that pre-existing finance strategies 
face when pursued individually.
The Sicomines Agreement, at its core, combines direct investment in 
resource extraction with infrastructure development. Phase I of the Agree-
ment sets the framework for this transactional mechanism.
94
It provides for 
an initial exchange of direct bilateral aid in the forms of a $350 million USD 
signing bonus (pas de porte) and a $50 million USD private commercial 
loan backed by mineral concessions from Gecamines, the DRC state-owned 
mining enterprise, to the public-private joint venture set up by the Agree-
ment (Sicomines JV).
95
It also pumps FDI into said Sicomines JV, a partner-
and/or Chinese state exerts significant influence over its operations, as it operates in the min-
ing sector. See Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 5, at 561.
91. See supra Part II.A.
92. See generally Wu, supra note 1.
93. Id. at 278–79.
94. Siu, supra note 8, at 630.
95. Collaboration Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
Group of Chinese Companies: China Railway Group Limited/Sinohydro Corporation Consid-
ering the Development of a Mining Project and Infrastructure Project in the Democratic Re-
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ship between Gecamines and the consortium of the Chinese parties, with 
68% ownership by the Chinese consortium and 32% ownership by 
Gecamines.
96
In return, Phase I requires the DRC to make several sovereign 
concessions up front, not only passing title to the not-yet-mined minerals to 
the Sicomines JV, but also implementing a range of regulatory tax and cus-
toms waivers.
97
Phase II of the Agreement disburses two $3 billion USD loan tranches
98
(referred to, collectively, as the “central infrastructure development loan”) 
from China’s EXIM Bank at a non-concessional (or “market”) rate of one 
hundred basis points more than the contemporaneous London Interbank Of-
fered Rate to fund large-scale infrastructure projects.
99
Subsequent re-
negotiations, discussed below, revised the central infrastructure develop-
ment loan down to a single $3 billion USD tranche with a slightly reduced 
interest rate mechanism.
100
The Agreement has Sinohydro and China Railway and other potential 
Chinese contractors tender bids to work on a list of pre-agreed infrastructure 
development projects,
101
and it transfers the entirety of the loan funds direct-
ly from the EXIM Bank to the Chinese corporate entities that win the infra-
structure development contracts, such that the financing never actually 
“leaves” China.
102
At this stage, the Agreement anticipates that the Sico-
mines JV will begin to produce mineral trade revenue.
103
The Agreement an-
ticipates this revenue to be sufficient to pay back not only the initial Phase I 
$50 million USD commercial loan but also to pay the costs of the $3 billion 
USD central infrastructure development loan.
104
Only after these loans are 
public of Congo arts. 4–5 (Apr. 22, 2008) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Mining & In-
frastructure Collaboration Agreement]. 
96. Id. arts. 3–7; see also David Landry, The Risks and Rewards of Resource-for-
Infrastructure Deals: Lessons from the Congo’s Sicomines Agreement 9–10 (China-Africa 
Research Initiative, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 
Working Paper No. 2018/16) (noting that the total sum of FDI placed into the Sicomines JV 
by the parties was later revealed to be approximately $3.2 billion USD). 
97. Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement, supra note 95, arts. 5, 14, 15, & 
16.
98. Siu, supra note 8, at 630.
99. Bräutigam, supra note 13, at 213–14.
100. See Maiza-Larrarte & Claudio-Quiroga, supra note 15 at 426–28 (describing the re-
negotiated central infrastructure loan); infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the re-negotiation more 
broadly).
101. Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement, supra note 95, arts. 8–11 & An-
nex C.
102. Id.; see also BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 2, at 142; Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 5,
at 561 (describing how the infrastructure finance component of these RFI deals “never 
leave[s] China but are transferred directly from the EXIM Bank to the (largely SOE) firms 
that have won the tenders for the work.”).
103. Siu, supra note 8, at 630.
104. Id.
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repaid in full do the Sicomines JV’s shareholders enter Phase III, receiving 
profits proportional to their ownership.
105
The Sicomines Agreement radically expanded the DRC’s access to de-
velopment finance compared with extant pathways of sovereign finance. 
The depth of Chinese capital reserves, and, more importantly, the unique 
coordination between corporate entities within the transaction, enabled the 
Chinese EXIM Bank’s provision of the Agreement’s $3 billion USD central 
infrastructure development loan. Moreover, the Agreement’s transactional 
structure removed two primary obstacles to the DRC’s pursuit of FDI by 
simultaneously providing for the revenue-generating investment (the Sico-
mines JV) and the infrastructure linkages that investment would use.
106
First, by guaranteeing that the Sicomines JV can export revenue-
generating products via rail, ports, and other newly-financed infrastructure, 
the Agreement removes the lack of pre-existing infrastructure in the DRC as 
an impediment to FDI.
107
Second, the Agreement provides a direct means of 
repaying infrastructure debt (the Sicomines JV’s trade revenue), expanding 
the scope of infrastructure that can be financed in this way. Using mining 
trade revenues to directly repay the infrastructure loan links the develop-
ment of “public good” infrastructure (i.e. infrastructure which is not directly 
profitable to outside investors) to profitable commercial ventures. That it 
does so through the mining JV’s trade revenues, rather than the state’s taxes 
and customs, directly ties FDI to infrastructure development where such 
links are, in other contexts, more tenuous. In other words, it enables the 
transaction to develop not only infrastructure directly used by the invest-
ment (the natural resource extraction project), but also other infrastructure 
projects designated by the host state, not necessarily related to the invest-
ment.
108
Finally, this bundling also enables larger flows of capital than 
would otherwise be allowed under the IMF’s de jure prohibitions on non-
concessional indebtedness. As discussed more below, bundling a variety of 
contractual obligations provides a workaround to those covenants, since it 
enables the inclusion of more factors or inputs in the IMF’s calculation of 
concessionality.
109
Additionally, many of the Agreement’s other contractual provisions al-
so integrate features of existing sovereign finance pathways. The choice-of-
105. Id.
106. See generally Nourzad et al., supra note 55; Ross, supra note 56; Sergeant, supra
note 58; IMF 2007 Art. IV Consultation, supra note 43 (describing the DRC’s obstacles to 
FDI-driven infrastructure development).
107. This would, according to prevailing views in the FDI literature, also encourage later 
FDI from other investors. See generally Robins & Perkins, supra note 51; Nourzad et al., su-
pra note 55.
108. See Maiza-Larrarte & Claudio-Quiroga, supra note 15 at 433–36 (detailing DRC 
infrastructure projects financed by the Sicomines Agreement).
109. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the mechanics and implications of the IMF’s con-
cessionality calculations with respect to the Sicomines Agreement).
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law and forum-selection clauses align the Agreement with established dis-
pute resolution mechanisms for traditional FDI—specifically, through the 
parties’ consent to participate in ICSID’s forum for investor-state arbitra-
tion.
110
Yet other features of the deal resemble sovereign debt transactions. 
In particular, in the event of Sicomines JV’s failure to pay back the infra-
structure loan, the DRC appears to have sovereign liability: The Agreement 
grants the Chinese EXIM Bank recourse to “other mining deposits, re-
sources, or other satisfactory means.”
111
Commentators have widely inter-
preted this clause to create a sovereign guarantee for the infrastructure loans 
that, much like ordinary sovereign indebtedness, directly impacts the DRC’s 
fiscal position.
112
As the Agreement largely incorporates transactional elements seen 
elsewhere, it is not impossible that its structure could have arisen among 
traditional, private, or multilateral entities. Yet, the Agreement’s deep inte-
gration of inputs and commercial modalities and the parties’ willingness to
suppress imminent profit for more speculative, even intangible, gains evi-
dence the Chinese state’s fingerprints.
113
These same features in turn give 
rise to novel legal quandaries, discussed in the next part.
III. The Sicomines Agreement’s International Law Implications
The proper legal characterization of the Sicomines Agreement has 
vexed political leaders, bureaucrats, and even judges. On the one hand, the 
DRC’s Central Bank Governor Jean-Claude Masangu declared that, after 
final negotiations concluded on the Agreement in 2009, “we are left with a 
purely commercial contract.”
114
Doctrinally, he was correct: The People’s 
Republic of China is not a party to the Agreement and did not assent to be 
bound under international law, precluding the Agreement’s characterization 
as a treaty under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (the 
110. Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement, supra note 95, arts. 20–21 (note 
that “CIRDI” is the French acronym for “ICSID,” or the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes); see also Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 5 (analyzing this genre of RFI 
deals in the context of FDI).
111. Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement, supra note 95, art. 10.3; Collab-
oration Agreement Relating to the Development of a Mining Project and an Infrastructure 
Project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Amendment No. 3, art 5 (Apr. 22, 2008) 
(modifying the Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement in relevant part) [hereinafter 
Amendment to the Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement].
112. See Maiza-Larrarte & Claudio-Quiroga, supra note 15, at 427–28; Malm, supra
note 27, at 131–32; infra Part III.A.1.
113. See, e.g., Kaplinsky & Morris, supra note 5, at 559–64; BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 2,
at 71–104; Malm, supra note 27, at 107–16; Siu, supra note 8, at 607–08.
114. Joe Bavier, UPDATE 2—Congo to Downsize Chinese Deal in Debt Relief Bid,
REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/congo-democratic-china/update-2-
congo-to-downsize-chinese-deal-in-debt-relief-bid-idUSLI37257520090818.
634 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:615
“VCLT”).
115
The text of the Agreement, particularly its dispute settlement 
provisions, also supports this reading.
Yet the Hong Kong courts—widely respected in commercial law—
reached the opposite conclusion, describing the Agreement as between “two 
sovereign states.”
116
In particular, the Hong Kong High Court found that, 
while China was not a named party to the Agreement, its SOEs were merely 
an “umbrella” between it and the DRC and accordingly held that principles 
of public international law governed the Agreement’s interpretation.
117
These conflicting interpretations and characterizations raise unsettled 
questions. What, exactly, is the Sicomines Agreement: A public internation-
al law treaty, or a private commercial contract? How do the separate legal 
frameworks for bilateral aid, FDI, sovereign debt, and commercial trade 
govern the deeply interlinked inputs and transactional modalities of the 
Agreement? While the interface between the Sicomines Agreement and ex-
isting international economic law is uneasy, legal issues arising under the 
Agreement may be divided into two analytical categories. The first catego-
ry, discussed in Section A, encompasses those aspects of the Agreement 
whose close resemblance to existing practices, or legal separability from 
other transactional structures, allows governance by existing rules. Section 
B argues that a second set of the Agreement’s transactional elements con-
found precise definition under existing legal regimes or subvert their under-
lying logic, posing novel legal issues. This novelty potentially upsets the 
parties’ ex ante expectations, distorting the Agreement’s risk allocations.
A. Aspects of Sicomines for Which the Existing Sovereign 
Finance Framework Is Adequate
Although the distinctive structure of the Sicomines Agreement presents 
many interpretive challenges, the existing sovereign finance framework is 
not altogether ineffective in capturing and governing aspects of this deal. To 
the extent that certain aspects of the Agreement—such as the assignment of 
sovereign contingent liabilities to the DRC and the formation of the Sico-
mines JV—still involve or closely resemble common sovereign finance ar-
115. Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement, supra note 95, art. 4; Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“‘Treaty’
means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law.”).
116. FG Hemisphere Assocs. LLC v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2008 
H.C.M.P. 928, ¶ 21, http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_
body.jsp?ID=&DIS=63653&QS=(firm)&TP=JU (C.F.I., Hong Kong, 2008). Although the 
Sicomines Agreement has itself never been litigated, the issue of its interpretation arose when 
FG Hemisphere, a U.S.-based vulture fund, acquired a multinational energy company’s arbi-
tral award against the DRC. Alleging that Sicomines Agreement-related payments routed 
through entities in Hong Kong constituted DRC state property, FG Hemisphere brought suit in 
Hong Kong seeking an ex parte injunction against the fund transfers and enforcement of the 
arbitral award under the New York Convention. See Siu, supra note 8, at note 185.
117. FG Hemisphere, 2008 H.C.M.P. 928, supra note 116.
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rangements, existing legal and customary rules provide a clear roadmap to 
resolving potential issues.
1. The DRC’s Contingent Liabilities as Sovereign Debt
Even as the DRC was negotiating debt relief with the IMF, it was also 
negotiating the Sicomines Agreement—containing sovereign guarantees 
with the potential to destabilize its fiscal position.
118
These guarantees in-
clude article 10.3, which is reasonably construed as an implicit sovereign 
guarantee of repayment, as it requires the DRC to use further mining con-
cessions or “any other satisfactory means” to repay the infrastructure loan if 
the Sicomines JV profits are insufficient.
119
They also include article 13.3.4, 
which makes article 10’s guarantee explicit, albeit after a period of 25 
years.
120
International finance rules require that any sovereign debt restructuring 
(“SDR”) participants accurately identify, account for, and incorporate a 
sovereign debtor’s contingent liabilities.
121
As a matter of soft law, the U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development’s Principles on Responsible Sover-
eign Lending and Borrowing provide that “debtors should make public dis-
closure of their financial and economic situation, providing . . . details of 
any kind of implicit and explicit sovereign guarantees.”
122
The European 
Union’s and the IMF’s respective regulatory frameworks have promulgated 
similar, more binding requirements.
123
These standards allowed the DRC’s major international creditors to 
identify the implicit and explicit sovereign guarantees in the Sicomines 
Agreement and incorporate them into their SDR conversation. In April 
2008, Belgium identified and criticized the DRC’s assumption of several 
billion USD in contingent liabilities pursuant to these provisions as jeopard-
izing its SDR program.
124
Over the next few months all of the DRC’s inter-
national creditors united in this consensus and voiced opposition to the 
Sicomines Agreement’s guarantee provisions.
125
This led, in part, to the 
Agreement’s renegotiation, and to the subsequent incorporation of the 
Agreement’s financing provisions into the DRC’s ongoing IMF-sponsored 
118. Bräutigam, supra note 13 at 213.
119. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
120. Amendment to the Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement, supra note 
111, art. 13.3.4.
121. Lee Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Restructuring a Sovereign Debtor’s Contingent Lia-
bilities 3–4 (Dec. 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
122. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, PRINCIPLES ON PROMOTING 
RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING, principle 11, implication 3 (Jan. 10, 
2012) (titled “Disclosure and Reporting”). 
123. Council Directive 2011/85, art. 14.3, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 41 (EU); Buchheit & Gula-
ti, supra note 121, at 3–4.
124. See Malm, supra note 27, at 131.
125. Id.
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SDR process.
126
To this extent, the existing consensus international rules on 
disclosure of contingent liabilities performed exactly as their drafters in-
tended: allowing stakeholders to identify potentially destabilizing off-
balance sheet liabilities and incorporate them into the SDR process or eval-
uate whether they should be incurred altogether.
127
2. The Sicomines JV and Investor-State Arbitration
The Sicomines JV created under the Agreement interfaces neatly with 
the international investor-state arbitration regime. The Agreement creates 
effective ICSID jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the Sicomines JV, 
providing protection for the Chinese investors’ property interests under in-
ternational investment law (“IIL”). The Sicomines JV is subject to ICSID 
jurisdiction since the Agreement manifests the DRC’s consent to arbitration 
and the Sicomines JV meets ICSID’s definition of an “investment” under 
each of the extant approaches in ICSID case law.
128
First, the forum-selection clause in article 20 expressly provides for 
ICSID as the dispute settlement forum, establishing the DRC’s consent to 
arbitrate disputes arising out of the Agreement.
129
Second, the Sicomines JV 
qualifies as an “investment,” under either of the two extant tests in the case 
law. The Salini multi-factor test articulates the traditional approach: A 
transaction is an investment if it involves (1) a contribution of money or as-
sets (2) incurring risk, (3) occurring over a period of time.
130 Salini also in-
cludes a fourth requirement—that the transaction contribute to the host 
state’s economy—whose inclusion has divided subsequent tribunals.
131
The Sicomines JV represents the quintessential investment envisioned 
by the Salini tribunal. First, it is funded by Chinese investors’ contribu-
126. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing these processes and the legal issues that arose dur-
ing them).
127. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 121, at 3–4 (discussing the purpose of rules on the 
identification of sovereign contingent liabilities). As Part III.B.1, infra, discusses, however, 
the liabilities’ substantive treatment in SDR presents more difficult legal issues.
128. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States art. 25(1), Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 17 U.S.T.S. 1270. (“The 
jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an invest-
ment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another Contracting State, which the 
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.”) [hereinafter ICSID Conven-
tion]. Note that whether or not the Chinese state is a party to the Agreement is a non-issue for 
determining ICSID jurisdiction; it is enough that the DRC, as a Contracting State, is a party, 
and that the investors are nationals of China, another Contracting State.
129. Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement, supra note 95, art. 20.2.
130. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004). 
131. See Electrabel S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, De-
cision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 5.43 (2012) (noting controversy over 
the fourth Salini factor).
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tions.
132
Second, both common sense and the Agreement’s text—particularly 
the sovereign guarantee—recognize the risk that the Sicomines JV will not 
be a commercial success.
133
Third, the Agreement is structured into chrono-
logical phases, rather than as a single infusion of cash.
134
Finally, the 
Agreement would likely also meet the Salini tribunal’s more stringent artic-
ulation of the test, requiring a fourth prong—evidence of the investment’s 
contribution to the host state’s economy—given the economic scale of the 
transaction and its direct contribution to the DRC’s physical infrastruc-
ture.
135
The Sicomines JV is also an “investment” under the modern, bilateral 
investment treaty driven approach laid out in more recent cases such as Ma-
laysian Historical Salvors. This approach considers the legal documents 
granting consent to arbitrate—typically, but not exclusively, BITs—to be 
the “engine” of ICSID jurisdiction.
136
Consequently, whether a given trans-
action constitutes an “investment” for ICSID jurisdiction purposes primarily 
depends on the definition contained in the applicable consent-granting doc-
ument binding the host state.
137
Although the Agreement does not explicitly 
define “investment,” because it contains a forum-selection clause explicitly 
granting consent to ICSID arbitration, a tribunal applying the Malaysian 
Historical Salvors approach would likely ipso facto recognize the transac-
tions in the Agreement to be “investments” for the purposes of finding ju-
risdiction.
Because, under either approach, the Agreement qualifies for ICSID dis-
pute resolution, an ICSID tribunal may enforce IIL’s enumerated set of in-
vestors’ rights and protections in the event of a dispute between Sicomines 
JV parties. Although the Agreement’s choice-of-law clause identifies DRC 
law as applicable to disputes, with international law to apply in the case of 
ambiguity, the DRC’s national property and investor protection statutes ex-
plicitly adopt IIL investor protection standards.
138
Through the incorporation of these IIL investor protection standards, 
DRC law first affords Sicomines JV investors protections from expropria-
132. See Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration Agreement, supra note 95, arts. 3–7.
133. Id.
134. See supra Part II.C.
135. Id.
136. Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 73 (Apr. 16, 2009).
137. See id.
138. See Investment Code (2002) art. 25, Law No. 004/2002 (Democratic Republic of 
Congo) (“The Democratic Republic of the Congo undertakes to ensure fair and equitable 
treatment, in accordance with the principles of international law, of investors and investments 
made in its territory, and to ensure that the exercise of the right thus recognized is neither hin-
dered nor in law, not in fact.”) [hereinafter DRC Investment Code].
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tion,
139
such that the DRC cannot seize or take title of Sicomines JV, except 
where such a seizure serves a public purpose, is carried out with legal due 
process in a non-discriminatory manner, and is accompanied by compensa-
tion.
140
In other words, as set out in the DRC’s investment laws, IIL affords 
investors recourse against the DRC if its actions, including through unfa-
vorable regulations or judicial decisions, have the overall effect of depriving 
the JV investors of the “effective use, control, and benefits of their property 
interests.”
141
Second, the IIL standards incorporated in DRC law give the DRC a du-
ty of “fair and equitable treatment” to investors.
142
Although the precise con-
tours of this duty are murky, recent tribunals read it to restrain “manifestly 
arbitrary” decisions
143
and to protect investors’ “legitimate investment ex-
pectations”
144
with regard to “specific undertakings” made by the host state 
to “induce” investment.
145
The DRC’s tax, customs, and regulatory com-
mitments within the Agreement could be held to form the “specific under-
takings” forming investors’ “legitimate expectations,” such that any materi-
al change in their application to Sicomines JV would create a cause of 
action.
146
If the DRC violates either of these protections, an ICSID tribunal could 
follow an established (if complex) set of formulae and factors to determine 
an aggrieved investor’s compensation, depending on the specific IIL viola-
tion(s) and the factual findings surrounding the investment at issue.
147
The harmony between the Sicomines Agreement and the international 
investor-state dispute settlement regime establishes a straightforward ave-
nue for resolving disputes regarding the DRC’s treatment of the Sicomines 
139. See CONSTITUTION (DRC) (2005), art. 34 (“No one may be deprived of his/her
property except for reasons of public utility and in return for prior payment of just compensa-
tion under the conditions established by law. A person’s assets may only be seized by virtue 
of a decision issued by a competent judicial authority.”); DRC Investment Code, supra note 
138, art. 26 (“An investment cannot be, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, nationalized 
or expropriated by a new law, and/or a decision of a local authority having the same ef-
fect . . .”).
140. See Steven Ratner, Compensation for Expropriations in a World of Investment 
Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/Unlawful Distinction, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2017) (noting con-
vergence within treaty law towards these four criteria).
141. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112 (1987); see also
DRC Investment Code, supra note 138, art. 26.
142. DRC Investment Code, supra note 138, art. 25.
143. Phillip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 5 (2016).
144. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID, Award, ¶ 621 (June 8, 
2009).
145. See id. ¶ 622.
146. Id.
147. See generally Ratner, supra note 140 (describing various formulae used to reach a 
decision). 
2020] Chinese RFI—The Sicomines Case Study 639
JV. This is not, however, to say that resolution of any such dispute would be 
predictable, convenient, or prompt. In practice, investor-state arbitrations 
tend to involve significant litigation and varying, sometimes even erratic, 
readings of legal doctrine.
148
Yet those aspects are longstanding features of 
the IIL regime itself,
149
rather than products of applying that regime to the 
Sicomines Agreement.
* * *
In sum, the current network of legal and customary rules surrounding 
sovereign finance is not entirely ill-suited to tackle some aspects of the 
Sicomines Agreement. In fact, these rules have allowed international actors 
to conceptualize the DRC’s sovereign-guaranteed debt and provide a clear 
and consistent roadmap to resolve most disputes that could arise out of the 
Sicomines JV. In these discrete situations that closely resemble established 
patterns of sovereign finance, the existing international legal framework is 
sufficient.
B. Aspects of Sicomines That Subvert the Existing Sovereign 
Finance Framework
More difficult issues arise where the Sicomines Agreement bundles fa-
miliar transactional elements in unprecedented ways. The Agreement creat-
ed a sui generis contractual structure that combined a $3 billion USD infra-
structure development facility with a public-private resource extraction joint 
venture, conditioning repayment of the former on the trade revenue of the 
latter. Additionally, it collateralized the DRC’s mineral reserves to secure 
the development finance loan. This integration of inputs and transactional 
modalities—and the Chinese political-economic structures that enabled 
them—push the contours of existing international economic law in two 
main areas: (1) incumbent sovereign debt contracting and restructuring 
frameworks, and (2) the doctrinal divide between international treaty and 
contract.
1. The IMF’s Debt Restructuring Modifications to Accommodate the 
DRC’s Sovereign Liabilities Under the Agreement
The Sicomines Agreement has challenged incumbent SDR rules and 
practices in several novel ways. Most significantly, the Sicomines Agree-
ment was a prima facie violation of the DRC’s covenants against subse-
148. See Julian Arato et al., Concept Paper on Issues of ISDS Reform: Working Group 
No. 3: Lack of Consistency and Coherence in the Interpretation of Legal Issues 1–2 (Jan. 30, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
149. See Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 241 (2008).
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quent incurrence of non-concessional debt.
150
Only a series of compromises 
among the DRC, the Chinese parties, and the DRC’s international creditors 
permitted the DRC’s continued participation in the IMF’s debt-relief pro-
grams.
151
These compromises fundamentally changed the landscape of IMF-
sponsored debt restructuring, raising the possibility of distortive effects over 
the course of the DRC’s own ongoing SDR process.
While the identification and disclosure of sovereign contingent liabili-
ties is relatively straightforward,
152
their substantive treatment in the SDR 
context is more complex and often diverges from ordinary indebtedness.
153
Indeed, sovereign guarantees raise difficult issues in a wide range of sover-
eign restructurings.
154
What is novel about the Sicomines Agreement, how-
ever, is the packaging of the DRC’s sovereign guarantees to fit within the 
covenants attached to the DRC’s participation in the IMF’s debt restructur-
ing assistance programs.
This structure reflected a series of compromises among the DRC, the 
Chinese parties, and the DRC’s international creditors that stretched the 
contours of extant sovereign debt rules. As mentioned above, the DRC’s 
creditors mounted pressure against the Agreement in the latter half of 2008 
and into 2009 for two interrelated reasons.
155
First, the DRC’s guarantee of 
Sicomines JV debt seriously jeopardized the DRC’s debt sustainability; and 
second, it violated the IMF’s de jure prohibitions on further debt incur-
rence.
156
Western political pressure culminated in the IMF’s then-Managing 
Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s May 2009 visit to Kinshasa, the DRC’s 
capital, to plead for reconciliation between the DRC’s participation in IMF-
sponsored SDR and the Sicomines deal.
157
Two weeks later, DRC officials 
and the Chinese parties re-opened negotiations, amending the Agreement to 
remove the DRC’s sovereign guarantee for the mining development loan—
but not for the $3 billion USD infrastructure development facility.
158
Fol-
lowing the amendment, the IMF recalculated the concessionality level of the 
revised transaction and found that the Agreement fell within the relevant le-
gal threshold for an exception to its debt incurrence prohibition.
159
While political ends motivated the IMF and its sponsors to make that 
recalculation, the bundled structure of Sicomines Agreement enabled them 
150. See Bräutigam, supra note 13, at 214.
151. Id. See generally Malm, supra note 27.
152. See supra Part II.A.1.
153. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 121, at 5–7.
154. Id. at 1–2.
155. See supra Part III.A.1. 
156. See Bräutigam, supra note 13, at 213–15.
157. See Malm, supra note 27, at 131–33.
158. Id. at 133; see also Amendment to the Mining & Infrastructure Collaboration 
Agreement, supra note 111, art. 6.
159. Malm, supra note 27, at 136; see also Bräutigam, supra note 13, at 213–15 (dis-
cussing the IMF’s definition and calculation of “concessionality”).
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to the manipulate extant legal definitions to do so. The IMF relied on two 
crucial assumptions in reading the Agreement as consistent with the DRC’s 
debt-relief covenants. First, the IMF read article 13.3.4’s explicit sovereign 
guarantee of the Sicomines JV revenues, triggering after 25 years, as an or-
dinary loan with a 25-year grace period.
160
In doing so, the IMF construed a 
substantial contingent liability as an ordinary loan but under “terms so gen-
erous that they look like aid.”
161
Second, the IMF read the $350 million USD pas de porte as indissocia-
ble from the loan component, calculating it as a grant within the infrastruc-
ture package.
162
As Debra Bräutigam points out, this diverges from market 
custom; the pas de porte was transferred directly to the DRC’s treasury as a 
signing bonus for the mining component of the Agreement and was not di-
rectly related to the Agreement’s infrastructure development loan.
163
Such 
provisions are “a common feature of natural resource extraction projects, 
but not public works infrastructure projects.”
164
The Sicomines Agreement’s 
structure, however, enabled the IMF to make such a leap: Because the min-
ing FDI and infrastructure loan components were integrated into a single 
agreement, the customary pas de porte on the resource extraction side could 
factor into an analysis of the concessionality of the infrastructure develop-
ment program.
By bundling transaction modes, the Agreement in its totality presented 
an awkward, uneasy fit for the IMF’s rules on further debt incurrence; its 
transactional structure permitted the IMF, under political pressure, to ana-
lyze it in ways that pushed the contours of those rules. The re-shaping of 
IMF norms allowed the Agreement to coincide with IMF financial facilities, 
but it did more: It changed aspects of the international, IMF-sponsored SDR 
process as a whole. Following its review of the Agreement, the IMF 
changed the subsequent debt incurrence rules for its debt-relief programs to 
allow participants to contract non-concessional debt on a case-by-case ba-
sis.
165
160. IMF, Democratic Republic of the Congo: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Re-
port 76 (IMF Country Report No. 10/88, 2010) (“The present-value calculations underlying 
the DSA take into account that the public guarantee can only be invoked after 25 years. . .
[W]e assume the worst outcome—zero operating income over the entire 25-year period.”); 
Bräutigam, supra note 13, at 214 (arguing that the IMF’s “extraordinary” methodological as-
sumptions are tantamount to construing the sovereign guarantee as an ordinary loan in defer-
ment).




165. IMF, Public Debt Limits in IMF-Supported Programs (July 2015), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/spr/2015/conc/index.htm (noting that the IMF’s 2009 re-
forms included the possibility of “case-specific” incurrence of non-concessional debt, and the 
“integrated treatment of concessional and non-concessional external debt”).
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By emphasizing flexibility to permit a potentially beneficial arrange-
ment for the DRC, however, the IMF traded off certainty regarding several 
legal questions that might arise under the Agreement down the road. Be-
cause the IMF construed the DRC’s article 13.3.4 sovereign guarantee not 
as a contingent liability, but as an ordinary loan in deferment, there is sub-
stantial uncertainty as to how all of the DRC’s contingent liabilities would 
be brought into an SDR settlement. Would they receive special, contingent 
liability treatment, or would they be modified on a strictly proportional basis 
as an ordinary loan?
166
The answer to this question is especially important 
since the invocation of this guarantee and its potential impact on the DRC’s 
debt sustainability is heavily conditioned on volatile global commodities 
prices.
167
Additionally, the Agreement’s mineral security provisions potentially 
upset the customary practice of IMF loan participants granting only the IMF 
priority (in debt distress scenarios, for example) and treating all other sover-
eign debt as pari passu.168 As a general rule, secured creditors receive pref-
erence over unsecured creditors,
169
but how this priority rule interfaces with 
the IMF’s normative supremacy over other creditors remains a novel issue 
for sovereign debt law and practice.
170
The uncertainty the Agreement gen-
erates with respect to the seniority structure of the DRC’s sovereign debt 
could thus disrupt any future SDR by the DRC, creating hidden risks for the 
DRC and other stakeholders in the event of the DRC’s default.
171
166. SDR often treats sovereign contingent liabilities in unique ways, since the nature of 
these commitments fundamentally differs from ordinary debt. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra 
note 121, at 1–7.
167. See Siu, supra note 8, at 633 (“[T]he reliance of loan terms on the fluctuations of 
commodity prices presents fundamental uncertainties about the retirement of financing.”).
168. On the implicit and shifting seniority structure of sovereign bonds, see Matthias 
Schlegl et al., The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneap-
olis, Working Paper No. 759, 2019).
169. This principle also appears to apply where sovereign and sub-sovereign debt are 
treated as secured debt. Nigel A. Chalk, The Potential Role for Securitizing Public Sector 
Revenue Flows 1 (IMF Working Paper No. 02/106, 2002) (“Secured financing” by public sec-
tor entities “subordinate[s] existing and future creditors”).
170. See Schlegl, supra note 168; BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 2, at 147. Indeed, few, if any 
formal mechanisms for establishing seniority in sovereign debt transactions currently exist. 
See, e.g., Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign 
Debt, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3740 (2015); Anil Ari et al., Debt Seniority and Sovereign Debt 
Crises (IMF Working Paper No. 18/104, 2018). 
171. BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 2, at 147 (“If a significant share of revenues is held out-
side the budget and used to repay the very large Chinese debt first, this could shake the foun-
dations of the system of privileged creditors.”).
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2. The Hybrid Nature of the Sicomines Agreement: Is It Governed by 
Private or Public International Law?
The Sicomines Agreement’s hybridity is not limited merely to its input 
and transaction types, but also encompasses its potential interplay of private 
and public international law. The Agreement is facially a contract, not a 
treaty.
172
The VCLT—considered the authoritative public international law 
text on treaty interpretation—establishes the bright-line rule that only states 
may enter into treaties.
173
Without a sovereign state party on the Chinese 
side of the transaction, the Agreement presumptively identifies as a private, 
commercial agreement.
174
Yet recent litigation surrounding the Agreement 
and applicable comparative jurisprudence have raised provocative reasons 
for reading the Agreement as sounding in public international law. Because 
the rules around contract and treaty interpretation can differ widely, the cur-
rent international law regime may inadequately capture the hybrid sover-
eign-commercial dynamics at play in the Sicomines Agreement.
First, in the FG Hemisphere case, introduced above, the Hong Kong 
High Court ruled that the Agreement is a “cooperative venture between two 
sovereign states,” rather than a commercial contract.
175
For Judge Reyes, the 
nature and scope of the Agreement’s commitments tipped it from a purely 
commercial contract to an agreement sounding in public international law: 
The transaction bore the “hallmarks of the exercise by states of sovereign 
authority in the interests of their citizens.”
176
The presence of corporate enti-
ties on the Chinese side did not “detract” from this finding, since their pur-
pose, as state instrumentalities, was merely to set up a shield or “umbrella” 
between China and the DRC to evade state responsibility.
177
As the Agree-
ment was functionally between two states, the Court held, public interna-
tional law principles applied.
178
Relevant comparative jurisprudence from the World Trade Organiza-
tion (“WTO”) bolsters the Hong Kong Court’s characterization of the 
DRC’s counterparty as the Chinese state, rather than merely the consortium 
of Chinese entities who served as signatories. The WTO considered a simi-
lar question in the context of subsidies. WTO law permits countermeasures 
172. Supra text accompanying note 115.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. FG Hemisphere, 2008 H.C.M.P. 928, supra note 116, ¶ 86. 
176. Id. ¶ 92. 
177. Id. ¶ 86; see also Siu, supra note 8, at 641. The Court’s finding bears some resem-
blance to a decision to “pierce the corporate veil” in corporate law doctrine, which recognizes 
that the owner of an otherwise limited liability corporation is, in fact, responsible for that cor-
poration’s liabilities in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Lowendahl v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 
247 A.D. 144 (NY App. Div. 1936).
178. See generally FG Hemisphere, 2008 H.C.M.P. 928, supra note 116.
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only against state subsidies.179 As the WTO Appellate Body clarified in a 
consolidated Chinese action against the United States, the test for whether a 
subsidy could be attributed to the state, when it was made by an SOE in-
stead, can be satisfied in two independent ways: (1) if a subsidy-granting 
SOE was clothed in the “authority to exercise government functions;” or (2) 
if the state exercised de facto control over the subsidy-granting SOE.180 Note 
that, under prong two, de jure ownership over an entity is not sufficient. Ra-
ther, the state must exercise “effective” control, for instance by directly con-
trolling appointments to managerial positions.
181
The WTO Appellate Body’s analytical framework for assessing when 
to impute an SOE’s actions to its state owner presents a striking parallel to 
Judge Reyes’s findings in FG Hemisphere. SASAC both owns and actively 
manages two of the Chinese parties to the Sicomines Agreement; in fact, 
because Sinohydro and China Railway operate within “critical sectors” of 
the Chinese economy, this active management is likely to be especially 
tight.
182
Furthermore, because the CCP exercises wide-ranging influence 
over high-level personnel choices at all three of the Chinese parties, these 
corporate entities also likely meet the de facto control test put forward by 
the Appellate Body.
183
Thus, under this analytical framework, too, a fact-
finder could impute the actions of the Chinese parties to the Chinese state.
Ultimately, the emerging international economic jurisprudence on Chi-
na’s cross-border trade and investment suggests that the existing interna-
tional legal framework—particularly the divide between private and public 
international law—cannot adequately capture the hybrid public-private dy-
namics at apply in the Sicomines Agreement.
184
The existing black letter law 
on international treaties, as articulated by the VCLT, unambiguously char-
acterizes the Agreement as a private commercial contract, rather than a pub-
lic international law treaty. Yet China exerts such an unparalleled degree of 
influence over the decisions of certain Chinese corporate entities that the 
fact-finders in FG Hemisphere and US—AD & CVD imputed those entities’ 
actions to the Chinese state. Without a clear and principled methodology for 
179. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Annex 1, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement art 1.1, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) (“[A] subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory 
of a Member . . . .”).
180. Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervail-
ing Duties (China), ¶ 318, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 2011) [hereinafter 
US—AD & CVD].
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 3 and 90 and accompanying text. 
183. See US—AD & CVD, supra note 180, ¶ 611(a)(ii) (imputing actions by Chinese 
state-owned commercial banks to the Chinese state).
184. See Siu, supra note 8, at 652 ( “[T]he frameworks of state responsibility and of pri-
vate actors seem to leave the conduct of hybrid actors in one of the ‘blind spots’ of investment 
law.”).
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articulating the legal implications of this hybridity, FG Hemisphere appears 
to create a precedent for applying doctrinal elements from public interna-
tional law in interpreting the Agreement, rather than solely from private 
contract law. This creates substantial interpretive uncertainty, since treaty 
and contract law differ dramatically on textual interpretation and second-
order rules regarding validity, modification, and other defenses.
185
This in-
terpretive uncertainty raises the unpredictability of dispute settlement and 
potentially disturbs the parties’ ex ante risk allocation.
* * *
The constituent, decentralized web of legal and customary rules that 
composes the existing framework of sovereign finance can adequately han-
dle some, but not all, issues arising out of the Sicomines Agreement. Inter-
national rules surrounding public debt efficiently addressed the disclosure of 
the DRC’s sovereign-guaranteed debt, and investor-state arbitration appears
able to resolve disputes arising out of the Sicomines JV. Yet the Agree-
ment’s transactional structure interfaces awkwardly with the IMF’s SDR 
regime and elides straightforward characterization under the doctrinal divide 
between treaty and contract. As the Sicomines Agreement’s mineral produc-
tion stages come into effect,
186
how these points of tension affect the deal’s 
risk-reward allocation and the broader framework of sovereign finance re-
main to be seen.
IV. The Sicomines Agreement and the Future of 
Sovereign Finance
While the Sicomines Agreement was unprecedented, it is no longer 
unique. Rather, RFI deals are an increasing presence in China’s economic 
relations with developing countries. In light of the Sicomines Agreement’s 
uneasy interface with the existing legal framework of sovereign finance, it is 
worth considering what systemic effects, if any, such deals might have on 
that legal framework and their normative implications. I propose two axes 
along which to think about this impact: (A) the extent to which international 
law, broadly defined, binds states acting domestically; and (B) the extent to 
which law mediates economic relationships transnationally.
A. Sovereign Finance and the “Resource Curse”: Implications for 
Financial Interventions in Domestic Policy
One of the central difficulties to the DRC’s economic development was 
insufficient infrastructure financing—its inability to find investors who were 
willing to assume the requisite levels of political and economic risk to invest 
185. Id. at 641–43.
186. See generally Landry, supra note 96.
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in DRC infrastructure at scale.
187
That the Sicomines Agreement unlocked 
$3 billion USD in infrastructure development capital represents an enor-
mous achievement in this regard, and forms part of a trend of drastically ex-
panding access to capital for states previously locked out of international 
markets. Yet the role of naked access to capital in sustainable growth has 
been contested, particularly in light of the “resource curse” dynamics pre-
sent in many resource-rich yet underdeveloped countries.
188
Both IFIs, 
through their financing and aid programs, and scholars have taken the posi-
tion that sources of sovereign finance should attach to sovereign commit-
ments on domestic policy, in part to counter governance problems engen-
dered by the resource curse. Chinese RFI transactions, should they continue 
to proliferate, have the potential to intervene in this field because they tend 
neither to impose governance covenants, nor to condition economic terms 
upon domestic policies.
RFI transactions, like the Sicomines Agreement, reinforce and extend 
the recent trend towards expanded access to capital among developing coun-
tries. In international capital markets, for example, lower prevailing interest 
rates—often times converging towards zero—in most of the developed 
world since the Financial Crisis have driven return-seeking investors into 
riskier but higher-yielding assets, including emerging market countries’ 
sovereign debt.
189
Over the past decade or more, these patterns have gener-
ated unprecedented amounts of liquidity for poor and middle-income coun-
tries.
190
This sovereign debt expansion did not reach all countries, however; 
sovereigns with fiscal positions and governance records deemed by markets 
to be especially poor remained largely shut out of access to capital.
191
As 
Part II demonstrated, Chinese RFI transactions like the Sicomines Agree-
ment, by bundling aspects of existing sovereign finance modes in novel 
ways, overcome these obstacles to deliver substantial sums of development 
finance capital to such states.
192
In this respect, the DRC, by entering the 
Sicomines Agreement, can be seen as keeping pace with the rest of the de-
veloping world in its access to sovereign finance, reinforcing a broader 
trend.
187. See discussion supra Part II.A.
188. See Sperduto, supra note 11, at 199–205; see also Antonio Cabrales & Esther 
Hauk, The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources, 121 ECON. J.
58, 61 (2011); Hans Gersbach, Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elec-
tions, 121 PUB. CHOICE 157, 159 (2004).
189. See Itai Agur et al., On International Integration of Emerging Sovereign Bond 
Markets 3–4 (IMF, Working Paper 18/18, 2018); Gene Frieda, Sovereign Debt Markets, in 
SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT 293 (Rosa Lastra & Lee Buchheit eds., 2014); Sperduto, 
supra note 11, at 193 (“Rich countries’ persistently low postcrisis interest rates are widely 
acknowledged as the primary driver of the growing supply of private credit to sovereigns in 
emerging and frontier markets.”).
190. Id.
191. See supra Part II.A.1.
192. See supra Part II.
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Whether improved access to capital can deliver sustainable growth for 
resource-rich developing countries, however, remains an unsettled question. 
As Luke Sperduto argues, while the interests of creditors, governments, and 
citizens in natural resource economies align in their desire for economic 
growth, there are divergences in who benefits from the nature and timing of 
that economic growth.
193
The “resource curse” engenders an agency problem 
in sovereign finance, incentivizing governments to misspend to the detri-
ment of their citizens.
194
This dynamic is captured in three main features:
(1) incumbent governments face a political imperative to credibly 
commit to expenditures that only benefit constituents if the gov-
ernment stays in power, (2) this imperative tends to produce a 
bloated public sector and underinvestment in education and (3) a 
bloated public sector and a shortage of human capital are detri-
mental to both the stability and rate of long-term economic 
growth.
195
In other words, merely supplying capital to developing countries’ gov-
ernments often will not produce the kind of sustainable, broad-based eco-
nomic growth their stakeholders desire.
196
Consequently, the IMF—the insti-
tution most deeply challenged by the Agreement—typically imposes not 
only covenants against further debt incurrence but also a range of macro-
economic and governance policy prescriptions ostensibly aimed at produc-
ing sustainable growth in poor, primary resource producing countries.
197
Scholarly proposals have alternately proposed contractual solutions, for ex-
ample indexing sovereign bond coupon payments to measures of human 
capital, to create countervailing incentives to the dynamics engendered by 
the resource curse.
198
It is thus striking that while many current and proposed forms of sover-
eign finance, particularly sovereign debt,
199
seek to discipline the agency 
193. Sperduto, supra note 11, at 199–201.
194. Id. at 199–205.
195. Id. at 202. 
196. See id.
197. See generally Alexander E Kentikelenis et al., IMF Conditionality and Develop-
ment Policy Space, 1985–2014, 23 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 543 (2016) (discussing the purpose 
of IMF conditionality programs and providing an empirical overview of their content between 
1985 and 2014); Axel Dreher, IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence, 141 PUB. CHOICE
233 (2009) (canvassing theoretical arguments for and against the IMF’s use of conditions).
198. See, e.g., Sperduto, supra note 11, at 219–29 (proposing “Human Development
Bonds” to create contractual incentives to counteract the agency problems created by the re-
source curse).
199. The concept of using law or legal governance to discipline agency problems with 
respect to developing countries, however, is not solely limited to sovereign debt. See Alan 
Sykes, The Economic Structure of International Investment Agreements, 113 AM. J. INT’L L.
482 (2019) (arguing that IIL can be conceptualized, in part, as reducing agency costs with re-
spect to FDI).
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problems engendered by the resource curse, the Sicomines Agreement con-
tains no such normative component.
200
The DRC is free to choose a list of 
infrastructure projects into which the Chinese contractors tender, and the 
Agreement does not otherwise impose conditions on DRC domestic poli-
cy.
201
These characteristics are by design: IMF conditionalities, criticized as 
sovereignty-intrusive and ineffective,
202
for example, have long grated lead-
ers of developing countries.
203
The lack of such conditions in Chinese RFI 
deals represents an attraction, rather than a drawback, for leaders of host 
states.
204
The Sicomines Agreement, when read in light of the resource curse 
literature, suggests that stakeholders and policymakers should consider 
whether the unique access to development finance that RFI transactions rep-
resent justifies trading off mechanisms—whether binding or incentive-
based—that address the resource curse and purport to promote sustainable 
growth.
205
200. See BRÄUTIGAM, supra note 2, at 148–49.
201. See Siu, supra note 8, at 615–26.
202. See, e.g., Thomas Stubbs et al., The Impact of IMF Conditionality on Government 
Health Expenditure: A Cross-National Analysis of 16 West African Nations, 174 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 220 (2017) (finding that IMF conditionality programs reduce per capita health spending 
by reducing fiscal space for investment in health); Timon Forster et al., How Structural Ad-
justment Programs Affect Inequality: A Disaggregated Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 1980–
2014, 80 SOC. SCI. RES. 83 (2019) (finding that IMF conditionality programs have contributed 
to inequality in borrowing countries).
203. See Kentikelenis et al., supra note 197, at 549 (noting criticisms of IMF condition-
ality programs as challenges to national sovereignty and the domestic policy space).
204. For example, John Mahama, then Vice-President of one of Ghana’s two major po-
litical parties, compared China to IFIs: “China has emerged as a significant source of credit to 
Africa[.] [T]raditionally our partners have been the World Bank and IMF. . . . The process of 
accessing World Bank and IMF credit has been unfortunately quite tiresome and comes with a 
lot of strings . . . we find it easier to go to the BRIC countries.” BLOOMBERG, Ghana Signs 
$1 Billion Loan with China for Natural Gas Project (Apr. 17, 2012), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-16/ghana-signs-1-billion-loan-with-china-
for-natural-gas-project. Some scholars have pointed out that creditors’ conditions on African 
states’ domestic policy raise some parallels to the history of imperialism, which in turn has 
influenced contemporary policy discourse. See, e.g., Uche Ewelukwa, Trade, Empires, and 
Subjects: China-Africa Trade Relations—A New Fair Trade Arrangement or the Third 
Scramble for Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 505 (2008).
205. This note does not assert a conclusion either way, but rather leaves the matter open 
for further investigation. Notably, some studies of recipients of Chinese development finance, 
including RFI deals, already evidence the dynamics Sperduto, Gersbach, and others predict 
with respect to the resource curse. See, e.g., Mohan & Tan-Mullins, supra note 2, at 1368 
(“These international deals are secured at the political elite level and so bypass established 
forms of national governance and accountability in the recipient countries, while the turnkey 
construction projects remain locally enclaved. The cases also show that wider developmental 
benefits are limited, with ‘ordinary’ citizens—especially those in the rural areas—gaining rel-
atively little from these major energy projects and the benefits accruing to urban-based 
elites.”).
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B. Sovereign Finance and Global Governance: 
The Future of the Rules-Based Framework?
Not only does the Sicomines Agreement imply an unorthodox perspec-
tive on the extent to which sovereign finance frameworks should constrain a 
state’s domestic policy choices, but it also challenges incumbent transna-
tional economic regimes—i.e. the rules-based regimes that mediate cross-
border economic activity. First, the Agreement amplifies emerging interac-
tions between FDI and the incumbent SDR regime. Second, the Agreement 
carries the potential to challenge the primacy of multilateral institutions.
1. Regime Overlap and Interplay
The Sicomines Agreement creates novel intersections between the vari-
ous pathways for sovereign finance and their legal regimes, traditionally 
thought to be separate. A prominent example is the emerging intersection 
between investor-state arbitration and SDR. Existing ICSID case law has 
suggested that actions taken by a sovereign in SDR may impact investors’ 
rights under IIL.
206
Because sovereign debt can constitute an “investment” 
for the purposes of IIL, a sovereign’s restructuring strategies could violate 
bondholders’ rights under IIL.
207
As neither regime explicitly provides for 
clear rules about overlap and interplay,
208
commentators have been divided 
about the desirability of actions taken under one regime being legally re-
viewable under the other.
209
The Sicomines Agreement amplifies these uncertainties, since it creates 
a novel collision between the two regimes: Its provision for FDI, packaged 
with a de facto sovereign-guaranteed $3 billion USD loan, destabilized the 
DRC’s participation in ongoing IMF-sponsored SDR by further burdening 
its balance sheet, in apparent contravention of the DRC’s IMF covenants.
210
The DRC’s inbound FDI, in the form of the Sicomines JV, thus potentially 
affects its restructuring process, since whether the DRC actually incurs sov-
ereign liability for the infrastructure loan will depend almost entirely on the 
JV’s trade revenue.
211
If the use of such complex package-finance deals con-
tinues to grow, stakeholders and policymakers will need to engage with ad-
206. See Rachel D. Thrasher & Kevin Gallagher, Mission Creep: The Emerging Role of 
International Investment Agreements in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 J. GLOBALIZATION 
& DEV. 257, 266 (2015); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in In-
ternational Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 715 (2007); Norton, supra note 14 at 292.
207. Id. at 747.
208. Waibel, supra note 206, at 717 (“Current international investment law has few rules 
to resolve such [jurisdictional] conflicts between the two regimes.”).
209. Compare Thrasher & Gallagher, supra note 206, with Norton, supra note 14.
210. See supra Part III.B.2.
211. Supra text accompanying note 182. 
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ministrable, predictable, and distributively just approaches to dealing with 
these complex, liminal legal spaces.
212
2. Multilateral Governance
Agreements like the Sicomines challenge the primacy of international 
financial institutions, especially the IMF, in ways similar to how China’s 
cross-border trade practices challenge the sustainability of the WTO.
213
The 
Agreement’s provision for effectively “secured” sovereign debt challenges 
the IMF’s implicit seniority within sovereign debt transacting and restruc-
turing; more broadly, the IMF’s accommodation of the Agreement in its 
SDR programs has undermined its normative, rule-setting primacy.
214
Yet 
while “China, Inc.’s” challenge to the WTO could create a real loss for mul-
tilateral governance,
215
the systemic impacts of China’s bundled approach to 
RFI are likely to be more nuanced.
The difference between WTO law and international finance rules ex-
plains why the Sicomines Agreement is likely to have a more attenuated 
impact. WTO law is hard law in the sense that WTO rules are promulgated 
by treaty and are enforceable by the WTO’s dispute settlement mecha-
nism.
216
By contrast, international finance—including the frameworks that 
govern sovereign finance (but excluding investor-state arbitration)—remain 
largely soft law guidance: influential, but unenforceable and more easily 
modified over time. Its institutions are similarly less centralized.
217
This 
fundamental difference represents what some argue are careful and rational-
ly chosen balances between hard (WTO) and soft (international finance) 
law, with differential balances between binding ex ante legal rules and mal-
leability over time. As Chris Brummer explains, the differences derive in 
part from how stable the consensus around normative rules is, and how dy-
namic the underlying economics in each field are.
218
Viewed from this perspective, China’s approach represents less of an 
existential challenge to international financial governance than to trade law 
because international financial rules are more flexible, and its institutions 
more decentralized, by design. Although the Agreement’s unique transac-
tional structure has challenged the status quo within international finance 
through its subversion of IMF norms and procedures, the nature and logic of 
212. See Thrasher & Gallagher, supra note 206, at 276–82. But see Norton, supra note 
14, at 291 (arguing that regime overlap may prove to be a “positive” development).
213. See Wu, supra note 1, at 314–22.
214. See supra Part III.B.1.
215. See Wu, supra note 1, at 314–22.
216. See Brummer, supra note 17, at 626.
217. See generally Wouters & Odermatt, supra note 21.
218. Brummer, supra note 17 at 628–41.
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international finance rules accommodate such evolutive changes.
219
In this 
respect, for example, the revision of IMF HIPC subsequent debt rules dur-
ing the negotiation of the Sicomines Agreement represents a feature, rather 
than an aberration, of the system.
To the extent the dynamics of RFI transactions disrupt status quo nor-
mative consensuses, however, their emergence may work against efforts to 
make certain international finance rules “harder” like the WTO regime—
more enforceable, institutionalized, and global. The Agreement’s ad hoc in-
terface with SDR, for instance, represents a trend away from the kind of 




The Sicomines Agreement is an innovative, even unprecedented trans-
actional structure. As such, it and future RFI deals of its kind carry the po-
tential to disrupt the operation of extant rules in two dimensions: vertically, 
i.e. the scope of sovereign finance legal frameworks’ interventions in a host 
state’s domestic policy decisions, particularly in the context of the resource 
curse; and horizontally, i.e. within global or transnational financial govern-
ance. While the Sicomines Agreement could push and stretch existing inter-
national finance norms along both axes, it likely does not represent the kind 
of systemic, existential challenge to existing frameworks that China’s trade 
actions do to WTO law.
V. Conclusion
Resource-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa face real dilemmas culti-
vating their resource wealth. Historical factors have often left them without 
adequate sources of funding for state-led infrastructure development. 
Through RFI financing deals, such as the Sicomines Agreement, Chinese 
parties have attempted to fill this funding gap. They have lent vast sums to 
host states to develop infrastructure at those states’ discretion, conditioning 
219. Cf. id. (explaining the choices and perspectives underlying the institutional design 
of international financial regulation). The international financial system has endured substan-
tial changes over time, such as the 1973 “collapse” of the Bretton Woods system of fixed cur-
rency exchange rates. See, e.g., Michael D. Bordo, The Operation and Demise of the Bretton 
Woods System: 1958 to 1971, at 21–26 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 23189, 
2017); CATHERINE R. SCHENK, THE DECLINE OF STERLING: MANAGING THE RETREAT OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY, 1945–1992, at 315–95 (2010) (providing a detailed historical 
account of this episode, focusing on the role of the pound sterling).
220. See, e.g., ANNE O. KRUEGER, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING (2002); Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform 
or Contractual Solution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483 (2004); Charles W. Mooney Jr., A Frame-
work for a Formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: The Kiss Principle (Keep It 
Simple, Stupid) and Other Guiding Principles, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 57 (2015).
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loan repayment directly on mineral extraction revenue and soliciting sover-
eign guarantees and other wide-ranging concessions.
RFI financing deals like the Sicomines Agreement integrate existing 
sovereign finance transactional pathways in innovative but also subversive 
ways. The bundling of various financing and development inputs expands 
the availability of capital and enlarges the scope of potential foreign-funded 
infrastructure development, but it also raises significant economic and legal 
ambiguities that may distort risk allocations. Definitional uncertainties sur-
rounding sovereign liabilities like those undertaken by the DRC undermine 
the security of lenders’ fiscal positions, particularly in the event of a future 
restructuring. More broadly, the Sicomines Agreement evades easy catego-
rization as a treaty or contract, introducing doctrinal uncertainty into its in-
terpretation.
The Sicomines Agreement’s varied and awkward points of contact with 
incumbent legal regimes surrounding sovereign finance thus represent a 
compelling case study for considering the systemic effects of bundled inter-
national finance pathways in RFI transactions generally. Rather than judge 
or predict such effects, however, this note proposes two axes along which 
future scholars and policymakers might think holistically about RFI transac-
tions: legal frameworks’ ability (whether regulatory or transactional) to 
shape or curtail host states’ domestic policy; and international economic law 
as transnational governance. Underlying the analysis throughout this note is 
an intuition of the significance of transactional structure and institutional 
process for RFI investment: They most strongly determine actual material 
outcomes for African host states and the stakes for international legal re-
gimes more broadly, and it is here that stakeholders and policymakers 
should focus.
